In this study, we seek to further delineate the reasons for the existence of shortfalls in the level of formal and material harmonization regarding the accrual-based rules in International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) by analyzing the law, the executive order and the Turkish Central Government Public Reports from 2010 to 2014 (using a mixed method approach). We highlight that coercive pressure itself is insuffi cient for improving substantive performance and changing the internal structures of organizations, instead, such pressures cause decoupling in fi nancial reporting.
. Introduction
The implementation of policies and techniques associated with accrual accounting is understood to be a crucial factor in modernizing the public sector in developing countries (Antipova and Bourmistrov, 2013, p. 444 ) and IPSAS has been considered a point of departure for streamlining central governments to improve transparency and accountability (Hughes, 2013) .
International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) based accrual accounting standards have been well established in most of the OECD countries, and 50% of non-OECD countries have expressed an intention to adopt accrual accounting, often using IPSAS as a reference point (Alshujairi, 2014 , p. 1). However, Deaconu, Nistor and Filip (2011, p. 76) suggest that emerging countries have too eagerly accepted the transition from cash-based accounting to accrual-based accounting, and argue that emerging countries seem to have taken it for granted that adopting accrual-based rules will increase effi ciency and eff ectiveness and solve many of the problems in their traditional accounting systems. S tudies have demonstrated that 'variation in accounting are still an essential characteristic of governmental fi nancial reporting' (Antipova and Bourmistrov, 2013, p. 443) even in countries in which Government Financial Statistics (GFS) and IPSAS have been adopted.
Several studies have uncovered evidence regarding various aspects of the adoption and implementation of accrual accounting in the public sector, such as ambiguities in the implementation process and the relationship between central and local governments (Arnaboldi and Accordingly, several hypotheses have been formulated to emphasize the problems causing a gap between the executive order (the regulations that are needed to implement the law) and the daily practices, which is also called material harmonization. However litt le att ention has been given thus far to formal harmonization, the gap between the law and the executive order. Therefore, apart from the gap between the executive order and the daily practices (material harmonization) insights into the gap between the executive order and the law (formal harmonization) could be an important factor for the success of the accrual accounting adoption and thus implementation. Hence, this study is designed as follows: we use a mixed-method approach (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) in order to improve our understanding of where and why the adoption and implementation of accrual accounting in the public sector fails.
First, we use a table derived from the disclosure items (Benito, Brusca and Montesinos, 2007, p. 303) to calculate the formal and material harmonization level as a means to determine the reasons for shortfalls. In the context of our research, (a) the Public Financial Management Control Law (PFMCL) represents the law that is in line with IPSAS; (b) the General Management Accounting Regulation (GMAR) is the executive order as the operationalization regulation of PFMCL; and (c) the Central Government Public Report represents the actual practices after the implementation of the executive order (please see Figure 1 ). We consider the gaps between (a) and (b) and between (a) and (c).
Secondly, because the aim of this paper is to shed light on the reasons for the shortfalls in the harmonization levels, we conduct semi-structured interviews with key public sector actors (see Table 1 ) to explain the reasons for shortfalls in the adoption and implementation of accrual-based rules. We use institutional theory and the decoupling concept to develop possible explanations for the gap with IPSAS. I n light of these research questions, we examine Turkey, which does not fi t squarely into either Europe or the Middle East (Müftüler Bac, 2005, p. 18). Similar to many emerging countries, despite the implementation of accrual accounting rules more than ten years ago in the Turkish public accounting sector, there are still shortfalls in the formal and material harmonization levels. This paper addresses a gap in the literature identifi ed by Gomes, Fernandes and Carvalho (2015, p. 269), Marti and Kaperskaya (2015, p. 177), and Ouslavista (2014, p. 274) regarding the lack of research on country-specifi c cases involving IPSAS. As a contribution, we reveal that the diff erence between the law and the executive order has been created intentionally as a way to avoid changes in the internal structures of organizations. Second, in accordance with Andrews (2012, p. 137), this study is a good source of data to deepen our understanding of possible failures in the actual practices of implementing formal rules in an emerging country in order to identify relevant practices for emerging countries instead of best practices. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 addresses the theoretical framework. The research questions and methodology are then followed by a presentation of the level of disclosure and discussion. The fi nal section presents our conclusion.
Theoretical framework
The rational motive behind several countries' decision to adopt the accrual accounting method is a common institutional theory, which is one of the major theo-retical approaches in public sector accounting research (Van Helden, 2005, p. 108). DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 150) identify three mechanisms for institutional isomorphic change: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism.
Coercive isomorphism arises from political infl uence and relates to the problem of legitimacy; it is characterized by the imposition of rules to adopt similar forms of change in both structures and processes. An important political concern at the national level may result in the implementation of IPSAS (Oulasvirta, 2014, p. 274) , and because Turkey regards the EU as a benchmark, its concerns are Turkey's main motivation for the change in the public sector accounting. Turkey currently enjoys financial and technical support from international bodies such as the IMF, the EU, and the WB, and one of the requirements for this continued support is the presentation of transparent and accountable fi nancial statements consistent with the international standards. Thus, inspired by international standards, the Public Financial Management and Control Law no. 5018/2004 was introduced by the Turkish government to provide accountability and transparency to encourage the eff ective, economical and effi cient distribution of public resources (in the form of coercive isomorphism). This accrual-based accounting regulation applies to public institutions, including the central government, local governments and social security institutions, through regulations based on the law, including the General Management Administrative Regulation, which is intended for application by the general management of the public sector in Turkey.
Mimetic isomorphism results from standard responses to uncertainty, and involves adopting changes that have been previously undertaken by other organizations. Reluctant organizations att empt to reorganize themselves in the likeness of organizations that they perceive as legitimate (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 152). Normative isomorphism, which is associated with professionalism, refers to the strong eff ects and pressures associated with professional affi liations. The infl uence of IFAC and IPSASB are examples of normative forces pressing for the adoption of IPSAS (Gomes, Fernandes and Carvalho, 2015, p. 272). These isomorphic processes cause organizations to become similar to one another, thus facilitating inter-organizational transactions. Although the three mechanisms may emerge under diff erent conditions and have diff erent outcomes, they tend to 'intermingle in an empirical sett ing' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 67). Notwithstanding the fact that each mechanism involves a separate process, two or more isomorphic pressures can operate simultaneously, and clearly identifying the eff ects of each type of pressure is diffi cult in such situations.
Although these processes increase an organization's legitimacy, they also confl ict with day-to-day activities (Nor-Azizah and Scapens, 2007, p. 213) in practice. Because of this incongruity between institutional pressures and an organization's exertions, institutional theorists argue that formal structures and actual operations of the formal structures often become 'decoupled' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 67; Nor-Azizah and Scapens, 2007, p. 213; Bromley and Powell, 2012). Decoupling is described as a gap between policy and practice that protects the technical core and the internal structures of an organization (Nor-Azizah and Scapens, 2007, p. 213). According to Weick (1982, p. 360) , decoupling is seen in situations in which elements aff ect one another 'suddenly (rather than continuously), occasionally (rather than constantly), negligibly (rather than signifi cantly), indirectly (rather than directly), and eventually (rather than immediately)'. Based on this background, Bromley and Powell (2012) develop two types of decoupling and argue that decoupling occurs on two levels: 'policy and practice' and 'means and ends'. In the policy and practice type of decoupling, organizations adopt policies but do not implement them; this form of decoupling is likely to be seen as an operational failure. In means and ends decoupling, rules and policies are implemented but they have only a weak relationship with the intended goals (Bromley and Powell, 2012: p. 485); this form of decoupling is increasingly common in contemporary organizations (Bromley and Powell, 2012, p. 491 ). Based on this background, in this study, we borrow ideas from the concept of decoupling to explain the gap with IPSAS.
Research questions and methodology
The concept of harmonization is studied from diff erent perspectives and within diff erent contexts in the literature. Empirical research analyzing international harmonization primarily falls into one of two major approaches: (1) studies examining accounting standards and other regulations (formal harmonization), and (2) studies analyzing the accounting practices of entities within a given regulatory framework (material harmonization) (Tudor, 2010 , p. 424); formal harmonization is the path and basis from which to achieve material harmonization (Tudor, 2010, p. 424 ). However, litt le research has examined both the formal and material harmonization of public accounting rules (Pina and Torres, 2003; Torres, 2004; Perez and Hernandez, 2007) . Against this background, we consider the following research questions:
1.a. To what extent are the rules adopted by emerging countries (e.g., Turkish public accounting executive orders) consistent with IPSAS (formal harmonization) in terms of disclosures in fi nancial reporting? 2.b. To what extent are the actual practices of implementing Turkish public accounting executive orders consistent with IPSAS (material harmonization) in terms of disclosures in fi nancial reporting? 2. What explains the gap between IPSAS and the levels of harmonization (both formal and material) in terms of disclosure items?
We concentrate on Turkey as a striking case mainly owing to its demonstration capacity for other emerging country contexts (Öniş and Kutlay, 2016, p. 7). First, Turkey is an emerging country with rapid economic growth and an intense democratization experience, and it is a strong practitioner of the public sector reforms. Second, Turkish political elites became very ambitious in implementing public reforms during the fi rst stage of the era of Justice and Development Party (AKP) from 2007 to 2011. Third, Turkey is a signifi cant case for emerging countries not only because of its increasing capacity and political willingness for the implementation of reforms in the public sector but also for its failures, regressions and decline in AKP's performance which caused the gap between the goals and results as of 2012.
To answer the fi rst research question, we used a 1) consists of items and statements that provide various types of information related to budgets, physical assets, the depreciation of physical assets, accounting for borrowing costs, events occurring after the balance sheet date, statements of accounting policies, statements of diff erences in fi nancial positions, contingencies, fi nancial leasing operations, fi nancial statement disclosures, consolidated fi nancial statements, the cost of services, and the eff ective, economical and effi cient distribution of resources (Benito, Brusca and Montesinos, 2007, p. 303; Perez and Hernandez, 2007, p. 152) to be disclosed in annual accounts under IPSAS. Because none of the items has priority over others and the items to be disclosed are regulated by law, we chose to evaluate the items dichotomously (i.e., as 1 for disclosed items and 0 for undisclosed items).
We an alyzed the year-end Central Government Public Account Reports between 2010 and 2014. Owing to the national anti-corruption law that has been adopted in 2010, we selected the period from 2010 to 2014, to ensure that all fi nancial reports have been reported under the same requirements. We also covered both periods mentioned above. Second, in the qualitative part of the research, in order to interpret the results of the table and explain the diff erences between the executive order and actual practices under IPSAS, we conducted semi-structured interviews (please see Appendix 2) with key experts so that we could gain insights into their perceptions (Atkinson and Shaffi r, 1998, p. 48). In other words, our research design provided us with a more complete understanding of the decoupling problems which arise during the implementation process from diff erent perspectives. It is acknowledged that the interviews as a source of data are subject to the interviewees' accuracy, biases and motivations; we interviewed individuals with diff erent types of roles, as proposed by Christensen and Parker (2010), such as: users of the information, producers of the information, promoters of the change, and commenters of the change such that we could avoid problems that may arise during the interviews as much as possible.
The selection of the interviewees was based on the expertise area (public sector finance) of the interviewees, and advice from the other interviewees. We checked how the opinions of the interviewees are representative and relevant as a group. Then we found that the interviewees had overlapping opinions. The interviews were conducted in diff erent sessions between May 2013 and February 2017 and lasted approximately 60 minutes each (see Table 1 ). All but four of the interviews occurred face-toface; four interviews were performed via Skype. 
The level of disclosure
The results (see Appendix 1) reveal a mean of 58% for the level of formal harmonization of the disclosure items in the executive order and a mean of 38% for the level of material harmonization for items disclosed in the Central Government Public Ac-counts from 2010 to 2014. Our consistent fi ndings between 2010 and 2014 show that the most neglected items in terms of formal harmonization were those related to the disclosure of business-like items such as consolidation, fi nancial leasing, and contingencies. However, in terms of material harmonization, the most neglected items were related to the disclosure of costs of services and the eff ective economic, and effi cient distribution of resources. Because shortfalls in the levels of material harmonization also included shortfalls in formal harmonization, we consider the level of material harmonization to be explanatory. We mainly focus on disclosure items because disclosing information regarding outputs of the public sector is particularly important for ensuring control of the public sector by stakeholders. The relationship between disclosure and accountability is not robust for all forms of disclosure. Instead of confl ating transparency and accountability, we must identify the conditions under which information disclosure actually boosts accountability (Nelson, 2003, p. 250) .
We begin our analysis with the budget-related items disclosed in the Central Government Public Accounts. The highest disclosure level is 87.5% for the budgetary information items; all budget items, including the functional, economic, corporate and fi nancial classifi cation of budget items, have been disclosed properly. This result, indicating proper disclosure may be based on the importance of budgetary items given the legal control of the budget in the Turkish governmental accounting context. In Turkey, as in other code law countries, the budget is used as a tool to exercise legal control (Manes Rossi, Aversano and Christiaens, 2014, p. 459).
Although IPSAS 1 does not establish indicators regarding the eff ective, economic, and effi cient distribution of resources, it does provide recommendations. Analyzing the harmonization level of items related to the cost of services and the eff ective, economic, and effi cient distribution of resources, we observe a disclosure level of 0%. The reason for this gap may relate to the structure of the information, in stark contrast to international standards, such that detailed information is not a component of fi nancial reports as described by the rules. By contrast, in Turkey, indicators of the cost of services and the eff ective, economic, and effi cient distribution of resources are generally presented in organizational strategic performance reports. However, strategic performance reports are not an integral part of the annual reports. In addition, Turkish society may be disadvantaged by 'the lack of pre-conditions for an information society' (Kocacık, 2003, p. 1) . Moreover, we observe that Turkish regulations have only a few rules regarding information disclosure and even those few rules are applied only partially in the fi nancial statements of the central government. These results provide important clues about accounting traditions in Turkey, as noted in our discussion section.
IPSAS 17 states the disclosures required for each class of property, plant and equipment. Whereas items regarding the disclosure of physical assets are neglected in the actual practices of the rules, items pertaining to the disclosure of the depreciation of physical assets are presented in the Central Government Public Accounts. The reason for this gap may be that information about the depreciation of physical assets is an important part of the executive order, but detailed information about physical assets (e.g., information on asset variation, intangible assets, and infrastructure assets) is not an integral part of the executive order. Based on the same logic, there are also many shortfalls in disclosures related to borrowing costs; the only item disclosed is the total borrowing cost.
Moreover, business-like items such as information about fi nancial leasing operations and consolidated fi nancial statements are not mentioned in any article in the executive order. Regarding fi nancial leasing, IPSAS 13 specifi es the details of disclosures for leases. In Turkey, even public institutions have the authority to engage in fi nancial leasing, and leased items are not shown in the fi nancial reports. Moreover, events occurring after balance dates are not disclosed in the actual practice of the formal rules. In fact, one article covers events occurring after the balance sheet date, but it is slightly diff erent from that contained in IPSAS. In addition, statements regarding variation in the fi nancial positions and information about contingencies are not disclosed in the actual practice of the formal rules.
Regarding accounting policies in the Turkish regulation, every entity is required to prospectively account for changes in accounting policies. Moreover, although changes in accounting estimates constitute an important part of IPSAS, they are not mentioned in any article of the executive order. In addition, IPSAS 3 describes the disclosure of changes in the accounting policies, changes in the accounting estimates and correction of errors. By contrast, when an error arises under the Turkish regulation, its correction is shown prospectively in the opening transactions of the next fi scal year.
Clearly, a signifi cant amount of fi nancial reporting information is disclosed, but further development is needed. Data that are considered a priority, such as infrastructure assets, depreciation, contingent liabilities, and information regarding effectiveness and effi ciency that remains hidden may gradually be disclosed. After 10 years of implementation of accrual-based rules that are largely in harmony with the international rules, Turkey remains in an early stage of harmonization. The fi ndings of the interviews are discussed in the discussion section.
Discussion
As a fi rst explanation for the gap mainly in terms of formal harmonization, we observe 'the means and ends' (Bromley and Powell, 2012) type of decoupling in the Turkish sett ing in which the rules and policies are implemented with uncertain relations to outcomes. This implementation, even with its uncertain relation to outcomes, clearly increases the legitimacy of the related public sector in the eye of international bodies, as donor support is particularly involved with the improvements to the law. However, instead of being homogenous and similar, the heterogeneity continues in a more complicated way with irrelevant outcomes. This leads us to the fi nding stated by Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge (2007, p. 165) that 'the primary objective of organizational change is not bett er substantive performance but greater legitimacy' in most developing countries, which is also observed in the Turkish case. One of the interviewees stated as follows: 'The accuracy of the fi gures in the fi nancial statements is  not as important as the fi gure itself' (F_1) .
Even though the law is in line with the international standards (WB_1, WB_2, WB_3), there is a signifi cant gap between IPSAS and the executive order. The gap in the executive order is being caused intentionally, instead of being an operational failure, in order to protect the technical core and the internal structures of the organizations from the external pressures (Bromley and Powell, 2012, p. 498). We observe that the coercive pressures of the international bodies may be a potent force in the decision to adopt accrual-based rules based on the central notion of legitimacy. However, coercive pressure itself is not suffi cient to lead to successful adoption and implementation, and thus to improve the degree of transparency or the disclosure level. Coercive infl uences are limited in their ability to aff ect the core aspects of the organizations (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2007) which are 'less likely to be visible and more likely to be protected from change' (Andrews, 2011) and causing decoupling. Moreover, instead of following the principles proposed by the law, the executive order is being used as a tool to protect the internal structures of the organizations as explained by the interviewee: 'Instead of following the requirements ordered by the law, they change the law and then ' Second, as an emerging country-specifi c explanation that deepens the gap in formal and material harmonization, changes in the Turkish public sector are rarely due to grassroots demand (F_1, F_2, U_1, WB_2) and the Turkish government does not face pressure from the society as in developed countries (Yüzyıl, 1996, p. 21) . Concomitantly, items regarding information supplied to stakeholders are the most neglected aspect of Turkey's formal and material harmonization. In the Turkish context, the users of fi nancial statements are not mentioned in any article of the executive order. Moreover, the statement 'the users of fi nancial statements' is not found in either the executive order or the translated Turkish IPSAS; this may be a strong indication of the nature of the relationship between the state and the civil society.
In such a context, one might argue that the applicability of the reforms depends on public pressure and citizens' expectations. Apart from public pressure, internal audits and external audits should be operating well, and the legislature should be able to force the executive to apply the rules; however, such an enforcement mechanism does not work in Turkey (CA_1, U_1). The absence of an active media in informing society further hinders harmonization.
Third, in Turkey, the state dominates the private sector, in addition to civil society and this may be one of the reasons for the shortfall in the business-like items for both formal and material harmonization. Sözen and Shaw (2002, p. 482 ) explain the situation as follows: '… the private sector is in a dependency relationship with the state. An indication of this is the way in which top Civil Servants transfer into the private sector. …. in the UK there is some degree of transfer of top managers from the private sector to government. This is almost unheard of in Turkey. As a consequence, in the UK a degree of private sector values enters the public sector, whereas in Turkey, it could be argued that public sector values enter the private sector'. In such a situation, 'introducing business-like items (e.g., fi nancial leasing operations, consolidation methods) into public sector accounting is quite diffi cult' (WB_2, CA_1). This diffi culty increases the buff er generated by decoupling.
Finally, critical problems arise during the translation of IPSAS concepts from English to Turkish that lead to the non-disclosure of certain items in the Turkish context with regard to formal harmonization (F_1, F_2, F_3 ). The problems lie in both the translations themselves and the understanding of certain concepts in cultures in which such concepts seem foreign (Zeff , 2007, p. 296 ). Such conceptual diff erences arise 'from the fact that the relationship between concepts and terms is far from univocal' (Marco, 2007, p. 265) , which leads to diff erences between the source text and the target text as a result of diffi culties fi nding suitable equivalents for accounting terms, as in the Turkish case. The solution to this problem is important for the application of a single set of accounting standards throughout the world.
Conclusion
Using institutional theory and the concept of decoupling, we argued that the change in the public sector accounting system in Turkey was primarily motivated by international organizations as a potent coercive force for the adoption of accrual-based rules. In Turkey's case, coercive pressures exerted by international bodies are clearly observed in the form of laws (such as PFMCL), which leads to increased legitimacy in the eyes of institutional bodies. Howev er, as a striking fi nding of our study, we reveal that the executive order (GMAR), which was issued based on the law (PFMCL), to streamline the Turkish system under international pressure, has led to a decoupling, because intentional diff erences between the law and the executive order were created.
Changes in the accounting system appear to have been implemented primarily to benefi t the Turkish government's image, particularly in the eyes of international bodies. In this sense, we suggest a crucial fi nding that without the destruction of the existing order and increased internal motivation, the pressure to change exerted by international bodies become a limitation in both the adoption and implementation processes. In such a context, as observed from the results, overall levels of harmonization regarding the disclosure items are relatively low (58% for formal harmonization and 38% for material harmonization), which may indicate that the reforms are somewhat behind the agenda of Turkey's central governments; hence, the magic shoes of IP-SAS do not fi t comfortably in the current context. Moreover, we emphasize emerging country-specifi c factors that deepen the gap in the level of harmonization, including a lack of social pressure which is generally more prominent in developed countries, and state domination over both civic matt ers and the private sector. In addition, this study emphasizes the importance of translating concepts in IPSAS from English into diff erent national languages as a potential common problem in the IPSAS adoption process.
Although accrual accounting-based rules were implemented nearly ten years ago, central governments may need more time to internalize them, and we should consider whether central governments and local governments can truly incorporate the NPM style of thinking into their routines.
Furt hermore, we must develop new ideas in order to translate IPSAS into public sector accounting behavior. It is not suffi cient to formulate fi nancial statements accurately; annual accounts and related information must be open to the public. In this aspect, information campaigns could target citizens to inform them about their rights to obtain information regarding government activities. Enforcement systems that seek to increase the level of disclosure may be useful for reaching sustainable institutional success. These results also off er some implications for policy making, especially for the disclosure items, for which the implementation of the IPSAS is critical. Bearing in mind the main ideas regarding the discrepancy between the law and the executive order, it seems quite critical to convince policy makers of the economy, effi ciency and eff ectiveness of the accrual based standards for the success of the implementation. It is obvious that special att ention should be paid to controlling the discrepancy between the law and the executive order which may be a potential problem in all emerging countries. A major recommendation to the international bodies that may be derived from this paper is to develop indicators to measure the change in the actual practices of the fi nancial accounting systems. Given the complexity of the public sector accounting reforms, special att ention should be paid to the adoption and implementation of the standards both by the national and international policy makers. Other suggestions include enhancing the role of national Supreme Audit Institution and linking its activities with the international bodies to bett er understand what is being executed in the operationalization of the law and the regulations.
Moreover, because non-native English speakers may be less confi dent in the translation and interpretation of the concepts from English into their native language(s), the importance of translation must be emphasized, with the recognition that good translation is crucial to success. A group of experts working on translating concepts from IP-SAS into Turkish or any other language should also link the translation of concepts with their actual practices in order to create a springboard for successful IPSAS adoption.
Finally, our results should be interpreted with caution. This study was based solely on the Central Government Public Account for the 2010-2014 year-end fi nancial reports. In future work, we must further improve our understanding by analyzing the public sector as a whole, including the central government, local governments and social institutions.
